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Abstract
There are different definitions of what a
troll is. Certainly, a troll can be somebody
who teases people to make them angry, or
somebody who offends people, or some-
body who wants to dominate any single
discussion, or somebody who tries to ma-
nipulate people’s opinion (sometimes for
money), etc. The last definition is the one
that dominates the public discourse in Bul-
garia and Eastern Europe, and this is our
focus in this paper.
In our work, we examine two types of
opinion manipulation trolls: paid trolls
that have been revealed from leaked “rep-
utation management contracts” and “men-
tioned trolls” that have been called such
by several different people. We show that
these definitions are sensible: we build
two classifiers that can distinguish a post
by such a paid troll from one by a non-troll
with 81-82% accuracy; the same classi-
fier achieves 81-82% accuracy on so called
mentioned troll vs. non-troll posts.
1 Introduction
The practice of using Internet trolls for opinion
manipulation has been reality since the rise of In-
ternet and community forums. It has been shown
that user opinions about products, companies and
politics can be influenced by opinions posted by
other online users in online forums and social net-
works (Dellarocas, 2006). This makes it easy for
companies and political parties to gain popularity
by paying for “reputation management” to peo-
ple that write in discussion forums and social net-
works fake opinions from fake profiles.
∗This research started in the Sofia University.
Opinion manipulation campaigns are often
launched using “personal management software”
that allows a user to open multiple accounts and to
appear like several different people. Over time,
some forum users developed sensitivity about
trolls, and started publicly exposing them. Yet, it
is hard for forum administrators to block them as
trolls try formally not to violate the forum rules.
In our work, we examine two types of opinion
manipulation trolls: paid trolls that have been re-
vealed from leaked “reputation management con-
tracts”1 and “mentioned trolls” that have been
called such by several different people.
2 Related Work
Troll detection was addressed semantic analy-
sis (Cambria et al., 2010) and domain-adapting
sentiment analysis (Seah et al., 2015). There
are also studies on general troll behavior
(Herring et al., 2002; Buckels et al., 2014).
Astroturfing and misinformation have been ad-
dressed in the context of political elections using
microblogging data (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011), fake
profile detection has been studied in the context of
cyber-bullying (Gala´n-Garcı´a et al., 2014).
A related research line is on offensive lan-
guage use (Xu and Zhu, 2010). This is re-
lated to cyber-bullying, which has been de-
tected using sentiment analysis (Xu et al., 2012),
graph-based approaches over signed social net-
works (Ortega et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2014),
and lexico-syntactic features about user’s writing
style (Chen et al., 2012).
1The independent Bulgarian media Bivol published a
leaked contract described the following services in favor of
the government:“Monthly posting online of 250 comments
by virtual users with varied, typical and evolving profiles
from different (non-recurring) IP addresses to inform,
promote, balance or counteract. The intensity of the provided
online presence will be adequately distributed and will
correspond to the political situation in the country.” See
http://bivol.bg/en/category/b-files-en/b-files-trolls-en
Object Count
Publications 34,514
Comments 1,930,818
-of which replies 897,806
User profiles 14,598
Topics 232
Tags 13,575
Table 1: Statistics about our dataset.
Label Comments
Paid troll comments 650
Mentioned troll comments 578
Non-troll comments 650+578
Table 2: Comments selected for experiments.
Trustworthiness on the Web is another relevant
research direction (Rowe and Butters, 2009). De-
tecting untruthful and deceptive information has
been studied using both psychology and computa-
tional linguistics (Ott et al., 2011).
A related problem isWeb spam detection, which
has been addressed using spam keyword spot-
ting (Dave et al., 2003), lexical affinity of arbi-
trary words to spam content (Hu and Liu, 2004),
frequency of punctuation and word co-occurrence
(Li et al., 2006). See (Castillo and Davison, 2011)
for an overview on adversarial web search.
In our previous work, we focused on opinion
manipulation trolls (Mihaylov et al., 2015a) and
on modeling the behavior of exposed vs. paid
trolls (Mihaylov et al., 2015b). Here, we go be-
yond user profile and we try to detect individual
troll vs. non-troll comments in a news community
forum based on both text and metadata.
3 Data
We crawled the largest community forum in Bul-
garia, that of Dnevnik.bg, a daily newspaper (in
Bulgarian) that requires users to be signed in order
to read and comment. The platform allows users
to comment on news, to reply to other users’ com-
ments and to vote on them with thumbs up/down.
We crawled the Bulgaria, Europe, andWorld cate-
gories for the period 01-Jan-2013 to 01-Apr-2015,
together with comments and user profiles: 34,514
publications on 232 topics with 13,575 tags and
1,930,818 comments (897,806 of them replies) by
14,598 users; see Table 1. We then extracted com-
ments by paid trolls vs. mentioned trolls vs. non-
trolls; see Table 2.
Paid troll comments: We collected them from
the leaked reputation management documents,
which included 10,150 paid troll comments: 2,000
in Facebook, and 8,150 in news community fo-
rums. The latter included 650 posted in the forum
of Dnevnik.bg, which we used in our experiments.
Mentioned troll comments: We further col-
lected 1,140 comments that have been replied to
with an accusation of being troll comments. We
considered a comment as a potential accusation if
(i) it was a reply to a comment, and (ii) it con-
tained words such as troll or murzi(lka).2 Two an-
notators checked these comments and found 578
actual accusations. The inter-annotator agreement
was substantial: Cohen’s Kappa of 0.82. More-
over, a simple bag-of-words classifier could find
these 578 accusations with an F1-score of 0.85.
Here are some examples (translated):
Accusation: “To comment from “Prorok Ilia”: I can see
that you are a red troll by the words that you are using”
Accused troll’s comment: This Boyko3 is always in your
mind! You only think of him. We like Boko the Potato (the
favorite of the Lamb), the way we like the Karlies.
Paid troll’s comment: in the previous protests, the entire
country participated, but now we only see the paid fans of
GERB.4 These are not true protests, but chaotic happenings.
Non-troll comments are those posted by users
that have at least 100 comments in the forum and
have never been accused of being trolls. We se-
lected 650 non-troll comments for the paid trolls,
and other 578 for the mentioned trolls as follows:
for each paid or mentioned troll comment, we se-
lected a non-troll comment at random from the
same thread. Thus, we have two separate non-troll
sets of 650 and of 578 comments.
4 Features
We train a classifier to distinguish troll (paid or
mentioned) vs. non-troll comments using the fol-
lowing features:
Bag of words. We use words and their frequen-
cies as features, after stopword filtering.5
Bag of stems. We further experiment with bag
of stems, where we stem the words with the Bul-
Stem stemmer (Nakov, 2003a; Nakov, 2003b).
Word n-grams. We also experiment with 2-
and 3-word n-grams.
2Commonly believed in Bulgaria to mean troll in Russian
(which it does not).
3The Bulgarian Prime Minister Mr. Boyko Borisov.
4Boyko Borisov’s party GERB had fallen down due to
protests and here is being accused of organizing protests in
turn against the new Socialist government that replaced it.
5
http://members.unine.ch/jacques.savoy/clef/bulgarianST.txt
Char n-grams. We further use character n-
grams, where for each word token we extract all n
consecutive characters. We use n-grams of length
3 and 4 only as other values did not help.
Word prefix. For each word token, we extract
the first 3 or 4 consecutive characters.
Word suffix. For each word token, we take the
last 3 or 4 consecutive characters.
Emoticons. We extract the standard HTML-
based emoticons used in the forum of Dnevnik.bg.
Punctuation count. We count the number of
exclamation marks, dots, and question marks, both
single and elongated, the number of words, and the
number of ALL CAPS words.
Metadata. We use the time when comments
were posted (worktime: 9:00-19:00h vs. night:
21:00-6:00h), part of the week (workdays: Mon-
Fri vs. weekend: Sat-Sun), and the rank of the
comment divided by the number of comments in
the thread.
Word2Vec clusters. We trained word2vec
on 80M words from 34,514 publications and
1,930,818 comments in our forum, obtaining
268,617 word vectors, which we grouped into
5,372 clusters using K-Means clustering, and then
we use these clusters as features.
Sentiment. We use features de-
rived from MPQA Subjectivity Lexicon
(Wilson et al., 2005) and NRC Emotion Lex-
icon (Mohammad and Turney, 2013) and the
lexicon of Hu and Liu (2004). Originally these
lexicons were built for English, but we translated
them to Bulgarian using Google Translate. Then,
we reused the sentiment analysis pipeline from
(Velichkov et al., 2014), which we adapted for
Bulgarian.
Bad words. We use the number of bad words in
the comment as a feature. The words come from
the Bad words list v2.0, which contains 458 bad
words collected for a filter of forum or IRC chan-
nels in English.6 We translated this list to Bul-
garian using Google Translate and we removed
duplicates to obtain Bad Words Bg 1. We fur-
ther used the above word2vec model to find the
three most similar words for each bad word in
Bad Words Bg 1, and we constructed another lex-
icon: Bad Words Bg 3.7 Finally, we generate two
features: one for each lexicon.
6
http://urbanoalvarez.es/blog/2008/04/04/bad-words-list/
7
http://github.com/tbmihailov/gate-lang-bulgarian-gazetteers/
- GATE resources for Bulgarian, including sentiment lexi-
cons, bad words lexicons, politicians’ names, etc.
Mentions. We noted that trolls use diminutive
names or humiliating nicknames when referring
to politicians that they do not like, but use full or
family names for people that they respect. Based
on these observations, we constructed several lex-
icons with Bulgarian politician names, their varia-
tions and nicknames (see footnote 7), and we gen-
erated a mention count feature for each lexicon.
POS tag distribution. We also use features
based on part of speech (POS). We tag using
GATE (Cunningham et al., 2011) with a simpli-
fied model trained on a transformed version of the
BulTreeBank-DP (Simov et al., 2002). For each
POS tag type, we take the number of occurrences
in the text divided by the total number of tokens.
We use both fine-grained and course-grained POS
tags, e.g., from the POS tag Npmsi, we generate
three tags: Npmsi, N and Np.
Named entities. We also use the occurrence of
named entities as features. For extracting named
entities such as location, country, person name,
date unit, etc., we use the lexicons that come
with Gate’s ANNIE (Cunningham et al., 2002)
pipeline, which we translated to Bulgarian. In fu-
ture work, we plan to use a better named entity
recognizer based on CRF (Georgiev et al., 2009).
5 Experiments and Evaluation
We train an L2-regularized Logistic Regres-
sion with LIBLINEAR (Fan et al., 2008)
as implemented in SCIKIT-LEARN
(Pedregosa et al., 2011), using scaled and normal-
ized features. As we have perfectly balanced sets
of 650 positive and 650 negative examples for
paid troll vs. non-trolls and 578 positive and 578
negative examples for mentioned troll vs. non-
trolls, the baseline accuracy is 50%. Below, we
report F-score and accuracy with cross-validation.
Table 3, shows the results for experiments to
distinguish comments by mentioned trolls vs. such
by non-trolls, using all features, as well as when
excluding individual feature groups. We can see
that excluding character n-grams, word suffixes
and word prefixes from the features, as well as ex-
cluding bag of words with stems or stop words,
yields performance gains; the most sizable gain is
when excluding char n-grams, which yields one
point of improvement. Excluding bad words us-
age and emoticons also improves the performance
but insignificantly, which might be because they
are covered by the bag of words features.
Features F Acc
All − char n-grams 79.24 78.54
All − word suff 78.58 78.20
All − word preff 78.51 78.02
All − bow stems 78.32 77.85
All − bow with stop 78.25 77.77
All − bad words 78.10 77.68
All − emoticons 78.08 77.76
All − mentions 78.06 77.68
All 78.06 77.68
All − (bow, no stop) 78.04 77.68
All − NE 77.98 77.59
All − sentiment 77.95 77.51
All − POS 77.80 77.33
All − w2v clusters 77.79 77.25
All − word 3-grams 77.69 77.33
All − word 2-grams 77.62 77.25
All − punct 77.29 76.90
All − metadata 70.77 70.94
Baseline 50.00 50.00
Table 3: Mentioned troll vs. non-troll com-
ments. Ablation excluding feature groups.
Excluding any of the other features hurts per-
formance, the two most important features to keep
being metadata (as it allows us to see the time
of posting), and bag of words without stopwords
(which looks at the vocabulary choice that men-
tioned trolls use differently from regular users).
Table 4 shows the results for telling apart com-
ments by paid trolls vs. such by non-trolls, using
cross-validation and ablation with the same fea-
tures as for the mentioned trolls. There are several
interesting observations we can make. First, we
can see that the overall accuracy for finding paid
trolls is slightly higher, namely 81.02, vs. 79.24
for mentioned trolls. The most helpful feature
again is metadata, but this time it is less helpful
(excluding it yields a drop of 5 points vs. 8 points
before). The least helpful feature again are char-
acter n-grams. The remaining features fall in be-
tween, and most of them yield better performance
when excluded, which suggests that there is a lot
of redundancy in the features.
Next, we look at individual feature groups. Ta-
ble 5 shows the results for comments by men-
tioned trolls vs. such by non-trolls. We can see
that the metadata features are by far the most im-
portant: using them alone outperforms the results
when using all features by 3.5 points.
Features F Acc
All − char n-grams 81.08 81.77
All − word suff 81.00 81.77
All − word preff 80.83 81.62
All − bow with stop 80.67 81.54
All − sentiment 80.63 81.46
All − word 2-grams 80.62 81.46
All − w2v clusters 80.54 81.38
All − word 3-grams 80.46 81.38
All − punct 80.40 81.23
All − mentions 80.40 81.31
All 80.40 81.31
All − bow stems 80.37 81.31
All − emoticons 80.33 81.15
All − bad words 80.09 81.00
All − NE 80.00 80.92
All − POS 79.77 80.69
All − (bow, no stop) 79.46 80.38
All − metadata 75.37 76.62
Baseline 50.00 50.00
Table 4: Paid troll vs. non-troll comments. Ab-
lation excluding feature groups.
The reason could be that most troll comments
are replies to other comments, while those by non-
trolls are mostly not replies. Adding other fea-
tures such as sentiment-based features, bad words,
POS, and punctuation hurts the performance sig-
nificantly. Features such as bad words are at the
very bottom: they do not apply to all comments
and thus are of little use alone; similarly for men-
tions and sentiment features, which are also quite
weak in isolation. These results suggest that men-
tioned trolls are not that different from non-trolls
in terms of language use, but have mainly different
behavior in terms of replying to other users.
Table 6 shows a bit different picture for com-
ments by paid trolls vs. such by non-trolls. The
biggest difference is that metadata features are not
so useful. Also, the strongest feature set is the
combination of sentiment, bad words distribution,
POS, metadata, and punctuation. This suggests
that paid trolls are smart to post during time in-
tervals and days of the week as non-trolls, but
they use comments with slightly different senti-
ment and bad word use than non-trolls. Fea-
tures based on words are also very helpful because
paid trolls have to defend pre-specified key points,
which limits their vocabulary use, while non-trolls
are free to express themselves as they wish.
Features F Acc
All 78.06 77.68
Only metadata 84.14 81.14
Sent,bad,pos,NE,meta,punct 77.79 76.73
Only bow, no stop 73.41 73.79
Only bow with stop 73.41 73.44
Only bow stems 72.43 72.49
Only word preff 71.11 71.62
Only w2v clusters 69.85 70.50
Only word suff 69.17 68.95
Only word 2-grams 68.96 69.29
Only char n-grams 68.44 68.94
Only word 3-grams 64.74 67.21
Only POS 64.60 65.31
Sent,bad,pos,NE 63.68 64.10
Only sent,bad 63.66 64.44
Only emoticons 63.30 64.96
Sent,bad,ment,NE 63.11 64.01
Only punct 63.09 64.79
Only sentiment 62.50 63.66
Only NE 62.45 64.27
Only mentions 62.41 64.10
Only bad words 62.27 64.01
Baseline 50.00 50.00
Table 5: Mentioned troll comments vs. non-troll
comments. Results for individual feature groups.
6 Discussion
Overall, we have seen that our classifier for telling
apart comments by mentioned trolls vs. such by
non-trolls performs almost equally well for paid
trolls vs. non-trolls, where the non-troll comments
are sampled from the same threads that the troll
comments come from. Moreover, the most and
the least important features ablated from all are
also similar. This suggests that mentioned trolls
are very similar to paid trolls (except for their re-
ply rate, time and day of posting patterns).
However, using just mentions might be a “witch
hunt”: some users could have been accused of be-
ing “trolls” unfairly. One way to test this is to look
not at comments, but at users and to see which
users were called trolls by several different other
users. Table 7 shows the results for distinguishing
users with a given number of alleged troll com-
ments from non-troll users; the classification is
based on all comments by the corresponding users.
We can see that finding users who have been called
trolls more often is easier, which suggests they
might be trolls indeed.
Features F Acc
All 80.40 81.31
Sent,bad,pos,NE,meta,punct 78.04 78.15
Only bow, no stop 75.95 76.46
Only word 2-grams 75.55 74.92
Only bow with stop 75.27 75.62
Only bow stems 75.25 76.08
Only w2v clusters 74.20 74.00
Only word preff 74.01 74.77
Sent,bad,pos,NE 73.89 73.85
Only metadata 73.79 72.54
Only char n-grams 73.02 74.23
Only POS 72.94 72.69
Only word suff 72.03 72.69
Only word 3-grams 69.20 68.00
Only punct 66.80 65.00
Only NE 66.54 64.77
Sent,bad,ment,NE 66.04 64.92
Only sentiment 64.28 62.62
Only mentions 63.28 61.46
Only sent,bad 63.14 61.54
Only emoticons 62.95 61.00
Only bad words 62.22 60.85
Baseline 50.00 50.00
Table 6: Paid troll vs. non-troll comments. Re-
sults for individual feature groups.
5 10 15 20
Acc 80.70 81.08 83.41 85.59
Diff +8.46 +18.51 +30.81 +32.26
Table 7: Mentioned troll vs. non-troll users (not
comments!). Experiments with different number
of minimum mentions for January, 2015. ‘Diff” is
the difference from the majority class baseline.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented experiments in predicting
whether a comment is written by a troll or not,
where we define troll as somebody who was called
such by other people. We have shown that this is a
useful definition and that comments by mentioned
trolls are similar to such by confirmed paid trolls.
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